There is a tendency to automatically use two-sided tests to assess the statistical significance of experimental results. Yet if a theory predicts the direction of an experimental outcome, or if for some practical (eg clinical) reason an outcome in that direction is the only one of interest, then it makes sense to use a one-sided test. The use of a two-sided test in these situations will lead to too many false negatives. Consequently treatment effects that corroborate a theory or that are of practical importance may be missed. This problem becomes particularly acute in the case of borderline results.
grounds of different costs of type I and type II errors. As pointed out by Baker and Mudge, 3 there are situations in which a type II error may be much more costly than a type I error. But however α is set, there is the problem of borderline results, ie nonsignificant results with P values close to α. 5 This is especially so if α is set to what might be considered a "low" value such as 0.05 or 0.01. To an extent, recognizing the existence of borderline results amounts to a discretized version of the P value/neoFisherian paradigm, with P values classified as "significant", "borderline" and "nonsignificant". Indeed these terms might just as well be replaced with, for example, "satisfactory", "suggestive" and "unsatisfactory", and the evidence against H 0 classified as "strong", "moderate"
and "weak". But note that α is retained. Of course what is to be considered "close" to α is arbitrary, but then so is α. In their discussion of clinical trials, Hackshaw & Kirkwood 5 assumed α=0.05 and considered P values in the range 0.05-0.10 to be borderline. This seems reasonable to me, and it brings me to the main topic of the present paper.
Statistical tests of significance can generally be one-or two-tailed (also called one-or two-sided), ie they can generally use one or both tails of the sampling distribution of the test statistic. But for a symmetric distribution such as the t distribution, a significance level of P for a two-sided test becomes P/2 for a one-sided test (<P for an asymmetric distribution). Thus the borderline result P=0.08 obtained with a twosided t test becomes the significant result P=0.04 with a one-sided t test. While the concept of a borderline result has lessened the impact of the choice of test (one-or two-sided) there is still a dramatic effect on how we view and present the result. So when -if ever -should a one-sided test of significance be used?
| LOGIC
In attempting to answer this question I take as my starting point the Popperian view of the scientific method (or at least the logic of that method). One has some theory, invented to solve some problem or explain some observation. Here the term "theory" implies an unjustified, unjustifiable conjecture about the causes of some phenomenon (or set of phenomena) as envisaged by Popper. 6, 7 One then deduces potentially falsifiable predictions from this conjecture, together with certain other premises (Popper's "background knowledge" and "initial conditions") and subjects these predictions to experimental tests. The analysis of such experiments often involves statistical tests. In statistics a prediction deduced from a theory is called a "hypothesis" (the "alternative hypothesis", H 1 ). This is an example of a statistical hypothesis, and it should not be confused with a scientific hypothesis, which for the purposes of this paper is the same thing as a theory. A scientific hypothesis/theory offers a causal explanation of some phenomenon; a statistical hypothesis is a prediction deduced from that conjectured explanation. To avoid confusion I will generally avoid the use of the term "scientific hypothesis", preferring instead the term "theory", and reserving the term "hypothesis" for statistical hypotheses.
If a prediction turns out to be false then, provided it is the conclusion of a valid argument, we can conclude that one or more of the premises (possibly the theory) is mistaken. On the other hand, if it turns out to be true we can conclude nothing, because an argument's validity does not exclude the possibility that the premises are false but the prediction is true. So the question that needs to be answered is this: is the prediction true or false? But as we all know in the real world only a probabilistic answer can be given to this question because of uncontrolled, unaccountable and apparently random variation (at least we generally model it as random). Thus an experiment may produce a "positive" outcome (ie one that confirms the prediction) or a "negative" outcome (one that contradicts the prediction). But in either case there is a possibility that the observed outcome occurred because of random variation. One way to address this problem is with a test of statistical significance. That is, for the nonzero predictions μ≠0, μ>0
and μ<0, we negate the prediction to generate its logical complement (μ=0, μ≤0 and μ≥0, respectively). This is the so-called statistical null "hypothesis:", H 0 (also not to be confused with a scientific hypothesis).
[Zero predictions, or more generally precise predictions (μ=μ 0 , where μ 0 is some specified constant) are outside the scope of this paper.]
Here μ is the true mean value of the sampling distribution of some parameter. For the purposes of this article we will take that parameter to be a difference in populations means resulting from some treatment effect. Then, under the assumption that H 0 is correct, we estimate the probability (P) of obtaining a value of the test statistic as large or larger than the one actually observed. If we choose to accept our prediction as true, then P is the probability that we are making a mistake (a type I error or false positive). We may also call P the rate of false positives or the type I error rate, with the understanding that the word "rate" implies the expected relative frequency if the study in question were to be repeated many times under identical conditions. Interpreted in this way, the type I error rate (=P) is a hypothetical quantity, although its maximum value (α) is real enough. It should be emphasized that P, which is also known as the "significance level" of the test, is not the probability that H 0 is true (eg Because of the logic of significance testing, it is generally said that we test H 0 rather than H 1 ("null hypothesis significance testing"). But this is simply because we require a statistical hypothesis specified by an equality in order to compute P (since the location of the sampling distribution of the test statistic must be specified in order to calculate these values). And under H 0 that hypothesis is μ=0 (specifying an upper or lower bound in the one-sided case). Yet it should be remembered that from a philosophical (ie Popperian) point of view it is the prediction (H 1 ) of a scientific theory that is under scrutiny, not H 0 (which, after all, is merely the negation of H 1 ; it is not a genuine hypothesis).
For a two-sided prediction of the form μ≠0 it makes sense to consider the test statistic without regard to sign, so that P is apportioned to the two tails of its sampling distribution (equally for a symmetric distribution such as the t distribution). This is simply because the negated prediction (H 0 ) is μ=0, and so any nonzero outcome -in either direction (ie x<0 or x>0, where x is the observed mean treatment | 111 MURPHY effect) -can be considered positive, confirming the prediction (H 1 ).
[In which case it can be argued that a two-sided prediction is not scientific in the Popperian sense because measurements of a sufficiently high precision and/or a sufficiently large n will always yield a statisti- and Curran-Everett, 12 I believe that only the side of the t distribution consistent with the direction of the predicted effect should be considered when computing P. Or in other words a one-sided prediction should be assessed with a one-sided statistical test. However I differ with Ludbrook in some respects, as will become clear. Also I do agree with Hurlbert & Lombardi 13 -although for different reasons -that it is hard to see a role for two-sided tests with unequal tail probabilities.
Either your theory allows you to predict the direction of a treatment effect (in which case you do a one-sided test with tail probability P) or it doesn't (in which case you do a two-sided test with tail probabilities <P; P/2 for a symmetric distribution). Note also that for the one-sided test P actually gives an upper bound on the type I error rate. This follows from the fact that P is determined under the assumption μ=0. But if in reality μ<0 when the prediction is μ>0 (or vice versa), then the true type I error rate will be less than P. The use of a two-sided test regardless of whether the prediction being tested is one-sided or two-sided implies that any outcome x≠0
should be considered positive. But I insist that it is a nonsense to define a positive outcome in such a way that it is capable of contradicting the prediction of the theory under test. Indeed this practice seems to me merely an example of "data dredging", 16 ie performing statistical tests in the hope that something significant will show up, rather than being guided by theoretical predictions. Moreover it leads to an overestimate of the type I error rate for one-sided predictions. For a two-sided test significant at a level P amounts to two-one-sided tests, one of which is significant at a level P/2 (assuming symmetry for simplicity). 17 Assuming μ=0, either of these one-sided tests may be significant by chance, but in the long run only one half of such tests will lead to acceptance of a onesided prediction. Therefore the true type I error rate for that prediction is P/2, not P. We can also approach this problem from the point of view of multiple testing. In testing a two-sided prediction we effectively test the same prediction twice, once in the right hand tail of the test statistic distribution and once in the left hand tail (either will do). Therefore a Bonferroni adjustment for multiple testing is required: 18 the critical tail probability is α/2, not α. But if we test two theories which make easier to reject the corresponding null hypothesis". In other words, for a given sample size, a one-sided test is more powerful than the two-sided alternative. That is, there is a lower probability of a type II error. This point can be expressed in yet another way. When planning a study the maximum acceptable ("critical") type I and type II error rates (α and β, respectively) must be considered. For a given choice of α and β a one-tailed comparison requires a smaller n than the two-tailed variety. Why this should be seen as arguing against the use of one-sided tests is a mystery for two reasons. Firstly, it is the type I and type II error rates that have primacy, not the sample size. That this is so can be seen from the fact that when planning a study one-first specifies α and β and then estimates the sample size required to achieve the desired value of β (α is independent of n).
| APPLIED RESEARCH
Secondly, for a given n, maximizing the probability of rejecting H 0 when it is false (ie the power, 1-β) is obviously always desirable. In the online supplement (Section S1) I suggest that the solution to this mystery is nothing more substantial than irrelevant suspicions about the motives of investigators. It is my contention that such suspicions should be disregarded. And whatever the power of a statistical procedure, that procedure must make sense. Counting negative results as positive does not make sense. Moreover, in the context of pure research, I would argue that the prediction under test should be given the best possible chance of confirmation because any theory is better than no theory. If the theory is wrong it will eventually fail in competition with other theories. In the context of placebocontrolled drug trials, a one-sided test is the more ethical choice because it reduces the number of subjects required to achieve the desired power. 31 
| ZERO POWER
Another widely expressed objection is that for a one-sided test, the power to detect effects in the direction opposite to that predicted or required is necessarily zero. The implication is that one must demonstrate that such effects are impossible, or extremely unlikely, or simply of no interest. 8, 9, 14, 22, 23, [32] [33] [34] As already indicated the last of these does indeed obtain in applied research where, presumably, the direction of interest (ie the required direction)
will usually be clear. The problem of zero power in one direction arises mainly in pure, theory-driven research, where the predicted direction of a treatment effect is deduced from the theory. Following Goldfried, 35 Lombardi & Hurlbert 14 address this issue by considering various scenarios for further testing and/or reporting of P values following a nonsignificant result for a one-sided test. These are: (i) report the P value and argue that the negative result is unimportant; (ii) do a two-sided test and report its P value; (iii) do a one-sided test in the opposite direction and report its P value; (iv) repeat the study and then do either (ii) or (iii). They conclude that none of these options is acceptable and recommend that two-sided tests should almost always be used in the "collective interest". Actually it seems to me that the collective interest is best served by making one's raw data publically available via the internet so that others may analyze them as they see fit. The role of repeating studies is commented on in supplementary Section S2.
Goldfried 35 recognized that other scenarios might be possible. I
suggest there is at least one: that one-tailed tests should be treated in exactly the same way as two-tailed tests. Thus if a one-tailed test returns a P value of 0.99 then that is the value that should be reported and the test result declared "not significant". This is option (i)
sans the accompanying apologetic arguments. As for the "problem" of zero power for detecting a negative effect, this is a pseudo-problem.
Citing Oakes, 36 Lombardi & Hurlbert 14 note that following a twosided test, and under the "principled assumption" that there was a treatment effect, one's confidence in the direction of that effect can be expressed as the quantity (1-P/2) (or the quantity (1-P/2)/(P/2), which they call an "odds ratio"; however a better term is "odds" 37 ).
This seems reasonable. Thus as the positive tail probability P/2 → 0 (or, equivalently, (1-P/2) → 1) we become increasingly confident that the true treatment effect was in the positive direction. But that tail probability is just the level of significance that would be reported by 
| ONLY ONE TYPE OF TEST?
The essential premise of my thesis is that experimental outcomes consistent with a one-sided prediction should be regarded as positive, while those inconsistent with that prediction should be deemed 14 If the evidence in favour of an effect exceeds 1-α or, equivalently, the evidence against is less than α, one may choose to accept that effect. But as already indicated the tail probability (P/2) of the two-sided test is equal to the tail probability (P) of the one-sided test. Hence if one assumes that μ≠0 a priori it makes no difference whether one does a one-sided test or two-sided test: the result is the same. This amounts to saying that there is only one type of test. So the need to choose between oneand two-sided tests is abolished.
To summarize: the advantage of assuming a priori that μ≠0 is that it avoids the often criticized statistical hypothesis μ=0 and also avoids the need to choose between one-and two-sided tests. Furthermore, the method is as powerful as a one-sided test, but also allows the detection of effects in both directions as in a two-sided test. The price to be paid for this desirable state of affairs is the abandonment of the null hypothesis. But since, I believe, many people will agree that in the real world the statistical hypothesis μ=0 is rarely (if ever) true, this hardly seems a high price to pay. From a practical point of view, α, β and P are determined in the usual way (although the P value from a two-sided test must be divided by two in order to obtain the one-sided value). There are of course some issues of a philosophical or logical nature. Specifically, there is no type I error because there is no null hypothesis. There is still a type III error, ie concluding there is an effect in one direction when in fact the true effect is in the opposite direction. The one-sided P value puts an upper limit on the probability of committing this error, and α is the maximum allowable value of P (although borderline cases are still recognized 
| CONCLUSIONS
From a practical standpoint, if the outcome of a statistical test is highly significant it may not matter much whether the test is one-sided or two-sided. But the correct choice becomes crucial in the case of a two-sided borderline result. Moreover, from a philosophical point of view, it may seem desirable that any method of analysis should make sense, regardless of whether the result is borderline or not. In this regard the question of whether to use a one-sided or two-sided statistical test is not about suspected -or actual -motives, or the collective interest or even statistics but simple logic: an experimental outcome cannot be both negative and positive in relation to a predicted or required outcome. That is, it cannot both refute and confirm the prediction; it cannot both satisfy and not satisfy the requirement.
An appreciation of this fact leads to the following simple rule: a onesided prediction or requirement deserves a one-sided statistical test.
The decision whether to perform a one-sided or two-sided test should always be made on logical grounds, not statistical ones. In particular the question of statistical power should be recognized for what it is:
irrelevant. Insisting that all tests for treatment effects be two-sided is not only illogical but unethical, because in a placebo-controlled drug trial it means reducing the power to detect beneficial effects for no good reason. A nonsignificant one-sided result can be assessed provisionally by assuming, for the sake of argument, that there was an effect. But if one chooses to take this assumption as a priori true, the problem of one-sided versus two-sided tests disappears; there is only one type of test. The application of the ideas developed in the present paper are illustrated in supplementary Section S3, which discusses two thought experiments of Ludbrook 8 concerned with clinical trials.
